US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
11-1-2001

Rapid Decisive Operations: An Assumptions-Based Critique
Antulio J. Echevarria II
SSI

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Antulio J. Echevarria II, Rapid Decisive Operations: An Assumptions-Based Critique ( US Army War College
Press, 2001),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/50

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS:
AN ASSUMPTIONS-BASED CRITIQUE

Antulio J. Echevarria II

November 2001

*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report
is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report
may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling commercial
(717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at
Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil.

*****
Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic
dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.
mil/usassi/welcome.htm.

*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the research of
our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming
conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a
strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are
interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at
outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-073-7

ii

FOREWORD
Most experts agree that no genuine military transformation or
revolution will occur without a corresponding change in operational
concepts. Merely replacing old equipment with new is not enough.
Militaries must also develop new ways to link tactical actions to
strategic ends. For this reason Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), an
emerging concept currently under development by the Joint Futures
Lab (J9) of Joint Forces Command, is particularly important for the
transformation of U.S. military forces today. An innovative and
viable concept will not only stimulate the development of new
technologies; it will also help balance the advantages and
disadvantages that the introduction of such technologies always
entails. On the other hand, a flawed concept will only lead to
frustration in training and disappointment in combat as results fail
to match expectations.
In support of the Joint community’s efforts to develop a viable
operational concept, Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II has
written an assumptions-based critique of RDO. He argues that the
concept’s developers deserve high praise for attempting to link two
relative properties—speed and decisiveness—but that the definition
of RDO is at present incoherent and based on several deeply flawed
assumptions. He concludes that RDO creates dubious expectations
and will likely fail to balance the strengths and weaknesses
introduced by new technologies. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria
further recommends a method for identifying and addressing an
operational concept’s critical assumptions. This method, which
offers a way to adjust operational concepts before they have claimed
too much in the way of resources, ought to become a standard part of
concept development.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

Technological innovation plays a paradoxical role in
military transformation. With each problem it solves,
technological innovation tends to introduce new challenges
or complications. Operational concepts can partly reconcile
these tensions by finding the optimal balance between
technological strengths and weaknesses. In so doing, they
perform two vital functions (integrating and stimulating)
for military transformation.
The concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) also
attempts to perform each of these functions. However, its
definitional incoherence and faulty assumptions have
caused the concept’s stimulating function to exceed its
integrating one. This monograph examines the coherence of
the definition of RDO, identifies and analyzes several of its
critical assumptions, recommends a method for identifying
other assumptions, and then proposes a reasonable
alternative to RDO.
The Concept Defined.
RDO is incoherent, containing no rationale for rapid
operations and only an impartial definition of decisive ones.
While the White Paper identifies the requirements
necessary to make RDO rapid and decisive, it is not clear
whether RDO can occur if some of the requirements are
absent. It is also difficult to understand why the United
States should invest more defense dollars to develop RDO
when it has very limited application across the spectrum of
operations (i.e., the concept is most applicable in high-end,
smaller scale contingencies such as Grenada, Haiti,
Panama, and Desert Shield) and since it merely perfects an
approach to war in which the United States is already
superior.
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Critical Assumptions.
While definitional contradictions and inconsistencies
can be easily corrected, the same is not true of critical
assumptions. RDO’s first and most egregious assumption is
that the National Command Authorities (NCA) will desire
military forces that are rapid and decisive in all scenarios.
Political leaders might well prefer a gradual approach in
most cases.
The second faulty assumption is that U.S. forces will
possess perfect or near-perfect knowledge of the enemy.
Information technologies have not yet lived up to
expectations in this regard.
The third flawed assumption underpinning RDO is that
an adversary is a system of systems that can be paralyzed by
a few well-placed strikes against his critical nodes.
Although a worthy goal, history shows that such paralysis
rarely occurs.
A fourth faulty assumption is that one can identify,
attack, and destroy whatever an adversary values most, and
in so doing break his will to fight. Ideology and political
realities make this a facile solution for some situations and
completely unrealistic for others.
The fifth faulty assumption underlying RDO is that all
elements of national power can be brought together in a
single operation that is both rapid and decisive. For
example, some of the most potent tools of economic
power—blockades and sanctions—generally require a great
deal of time to work and often entail a significant amount of
collateral damage.
Identifying and Analyzing Assumptions.
Concept development would benefit from a process that
required the identification and analysis of critical
assumptions. With minor effort one could modify the
Assumption-Based Planning tool developed by the RAND
vi

Corporation for such uses. Assumption-Based Planning
involves five steps: 1) identifying the explicit and implicit
assumptions expected to remain true over a reasonable time
horizon; 2) identifying assumption vulnerabilities; 3)
defining signposts that will indicate when one or more
assumptions has become vulnerable; 4) defining
appropriate shaping actions that avoid assumption
vulnerabilities; and 5) defining hedging actions that
minimize the impact of an assumption failure. However,
even Assumption-Based Planning is not a silver bullet.
An Alternative Concept.
Whereas RDO focuses on attacking an opponent’s center
of gravity or threatening “what he values most,” a concept
that concentrates on interdependent—or fully
Joint—maneuver would permit policymakers to determine
for themselves what the military instrument should
accomplish. The Joint Staff’s experimenters should analyze
the kinds of political objectives that U.S. military forces will
most likely have to accomplish over the next 15-20 years,
and then develop ways to get at them. Attacking what the
enemy values most is not always the best route to the
objective.
In sum, RDO fails in its integrative function. It is an
incoherent concept that rests on several faulty
assumptions. To prevent such concepts from creating false
expectations and leading to potentially disastrous results,
the U.S. military will need a process for identifying and
analyzing assumptions in concept development.
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RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS:
AN ASSUMPTIONS-BASED CRITIQUE

Antulio J. Echevarria II
Whether one believes that the current transformation of
the U.S. military is part of a comprehensive Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) or merely a reasonable response to
evolving operational and strategic demands, change is
clearly underway. Yet, technological innovation—a major
driver of such change—plays a paradoxical role in military
transformation. Today, a growing number of weapons can
strike with greater accuracy over extended distances;
however, those same or similar weapons in the hands of an
adversary will mean significant anti-access challenges for
friendly forces. Innovations in fuel and propulsion systems
may help to reduce the cumbersome logistical tail of
maneuver forces, but the longer distances that such forces
must traverse will, in turn, put additional strains on those
systems. Information and communication systems can
enhance operational control and facilitate decentralized
operations, yet they also require larger staffs and more
skilled junior leaders trained to operate independently. In a
final example, advances in biogenetic engineering have
already revealed several ways to increase (as well as
exploit) the physical capacities of individual soldiers;
however, they have also raised complex moral and ethical
questions about doing so. In short, with each problem they
solve, technological innovations tend to introduce new
challenges or complications.
Fortunately, operational concepts can partly reconcile
such tensions. They can find the optimal balance between
technological strengths and weaknesses. If technological
innovations do not permit the reduction of logistical tails,
for example, operational concepts could aim at achieving
1

the best possible results within existing logistical
constraints. Concepts also provide a mark on the wall for
technological development, stimulating the research and
development communities to move beyond current
capabilities toward those described in vision documents
such as Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020). In short, operational
concepts occupy the intellectual space between doctrine and
vision and help convert desired capabilities (vision) into
something practicable (doctrine). Hence, operational
concepts perform two vital functions (integrating and
stimulating) in the course of a military’s transformation.
The concept of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)
attempts to serve both purposes.1 Its developers clearly
intended to use it to put a very high mark on the wall in
order to stimulate research and development. For that, they
deserve high praise. They also deserve high praise for
having made numerous improvements in the concept,
especially over the last 6 months or so.
However, while stretching operational concepts can help
pull technological development, history shows that concepts
can sometimes get too far ahead of emerging capabilities.
When they do, such concepts tend to fail in their integrative
function and create expectations that can lead to
disappointing, if not disastrous, results. RDO’s developers
have, in fact, emphasized their concept’s stimulating
function at the cost of its integrating one and have
consequently generated a number of dubious expectations.
An objective analysis of the concept reveals that not only
is the definition of RDO incoherent, it rests on a number of
faulty assumptions. If left uncorrected, these faults will not
only undermine the concept’s overall effectiveness, they
could well result in adverse consequences for the military
forces of the United States. This monograph examines the
coherence of the definition of RDO, identifies and analyzes
several of its critical assumptions, recommends a method
for identifying other assumptions, and then proposes a
reasonable alternative to RDO.
2

The Concept Defined.
According to its White Paper (dated August 9, 2001),
RDO was intended to function as an integrating concept
oriented on high-end, small-scale contingencies in the 2015
time frame.2
RDO:
will integrate knowledge, command and control, and
effects-based operations to achieve the desired
political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting an
RDO, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other
instruments of national power to understand and reduce the
regional adversary’s critical capabilities and coherence. The
United States and its allies asymmetrically assault the
adversary from directions and in dimensions against which he
has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation.
The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable
to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease actions that are
against U.S. interests or has his capabilities defeated.3

Unfortunately, the definition is incoherent. For
example, it contains no mention of any rationale for making
RDO rapid. Everything in the definition would apply
equally well to an operation conducted in a gradual or
deliberate manner. Moreover, it implies that being decisive
means the adversary “chooses” to cease activities that “are
against U.S. interests.” However, a better definition of
decisive would include not only forcing the enemy to cease
certain activities—such as ethnic cleansing—but
compelling him to commence others, such as the withdrawal
of his armed forces.
The definition also states that, in RDO, the United
States and its allies would assault the adversary
“asymmetrically” from directions and in dimensions against
which he has “no counter.” This sentence implies that RDO
can occur only via asymmetric ways and will never take
place against an adversary that possesses an asymmetric
“counter,” however limited. Also, the emphasis on attacking
an opponent’s coherence (not defined until some pages later)
3

suggests that an enemy fighting incoherently is not a
concern. With the proliferation of Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, High-explosive/High-yield (CBRNE)
weapons that is expected to occur by 2015-20, even an
adversary “suffering from loss of coherence” can pose
serious security challenges to the United States and its
allies. It is also difficult to see how an incoherent adversary
can make his forces comply with desired peace terms.
The definition’s inconsistencies notwithstanding, RDO’s
developers deserve high praise for combining (or attempting
to combine) two sometimes conflicting properties—speed
and decisiveness—into a single operational concept. This is
a bold endeavor. Speed—defined as “accomplishing the
objectives of the campaign as rapidly as possible”—and
decisiveness—defined as “imposing our will on the enemy
by breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability
to resist”—are relative properties.4 Each depends on an
adversary’s capabilities and will to resist. Historically, the
desire to arrive faster has competed with the need to have
the force necessary upon arrival to compel an adversary to
submit. Neither property should be stressed at the expense
of the other. Yet, while some advances in both maneuver
and firepower technologies will likely occur by 2015, the
probability remains high that some tension will still exist
between speed and decisiveness. Concept developers will
have to address that tension to ensure the synergy that
occurs when speed and decisiveness are combined is not
lost.
The White Paper also identifies the requirements
necessary to make RDO rapid and decisive. However, the
large number of requirements begs the question as to
whether RDO can occur if some of the requirements are
absent. If not, one has to wonder why the United States
should invest in a concept that is so brittle. For example, to
achieve speed, RDO must have:
• Knowledge: Detailed understanding of enemy and
ourselves;
4

• Early start to planning, timely decisions;
• Forward presence and rapid movement;
• Tailored forces and sustainment;
• Intense high tempo of operations;
• Responsive C2 Systems, established joint
headquarters element, and compressed decision process.5
Similarly, to achieve decisiveness, RDO must have:
• Knowledge: Identify and affect what is most valuable
to enemy;
• Effects-based operations employing full range of
national capabilities;
• Info superiority, dominant maneuver, and precision
engagement to apply synchronized precision effects to
generate overwhelming shock;
• Responsive C2 Systems and shortened response cycle;
• Relentlessness.6
Indeed, one could well make the argument that such
capabilities would enable just about any operational
concept to work. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why
the United States should invest more defense dollars to
develop a concept—such as RDO—that applies only to a
limited portion of the spectrum of operations, namely,
“high-end, smaller-scale contingencies” such as Grenada,
Haiti, and Panama.7 Furthermore, RDO merely seeks to
perfect an approach to war in which the United States is
already superior. Instead, the U.S. military should invest
more resources in developing concepts for those scenarios
that occupy the middle to lower end of the spectrum. Most
projections of the future security environment assign a high
probability of occurrence to such operations for the next
10-15 years; and such scenarios have traditionally posed the
greatest challenges for U.S. forces.8
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Critical Assumptions.
While definitional contradictions and inconsistencies
can be easily corrected, the same is not true of critical
assumptions. Correcting faulty assumptions may require
reworking the fundamental concept entirely. RDO is based
on a number of faulty assumptions, but this monograph will
analyze only the most critical here.
The first and most egregious assumption that RDO
makes is that the National Command Authorities (NCA)
will understand the need for, or even desire, operations that
are rapid and decisive in all scenarios. The White Paper
continually stresses speed in the application of force.
However, the NCA may consider a graduated response more
appropriate for any number of reasons, such as the desire to
avoid escalation to nuclear weapons or to keep allies or
coalition partners in the fight. Thus, while RDO purports to
offer the NCA additional options, it actually diminishes
them, compelling decisionmakers to embark upon a major
commitment of forces even in a small-scale contingency.
This inflexible, one-sided approach to military strategy
plunged Western Europe into a devastating conflict in 1914
when all-or-nothing war plans deprived political leaders of
the flexibility of pursuing limited aims. Therefore, while
calling for an integrated application of all national
capabilities for the accomplishment of political objectives,
RDO actually treats military operations in a vacuum,
disassociating them from political aims.
The second faulty assumption in RDO relates to
knowledge (defined above). RDO asserts that U.S. forces
will possess perfect or near-perfect knowledge of the enemy
through an Operational Net Assessment (ONA)—defined as
a continuously updated, system-of-systems analysis of the
adversary’s total war-making capabilities matched against
likely courses of action.9 Yet, it is unclear how such
continuous ONA updates will occur rapidly (if at all)
6

without greater resources, such as larger staffs, at each
level of command. Artificial intelligence and similar
systems have so far not lived up to expectations in this
regard. Furthermore, while information systems have
shown themselves capable of amassing vast amounts of
data, data itself is not necessarily information and
information is not necessarily knowledge.
As a corollary, RDO assumes that such knowledge
enables the key links and nodes within an adversary’s
systems to be identified and attacked. RDO also presumes
that attacking those nodes will produce predictable first,
second, and even third-order effects that can collapse an
adversary’s will and/or destroy his capability to resist.10The
White Paper defines such Effects-Based Operations as “a
process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or ‘effect’
on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative, and
cumulative application of the full range of military and
other national capabilities at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels.” An effect is defined as the “physical,
functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence
that results from specific military and non-military
actions.”11
Efforts to explore effects-based operations are, first of
all, to be applauded for moving away from the old
force-on-force Lanchester war-gaming models, which
reduced warfare to a simple calculus of attrition.12 This
approach also has the benefit, as retired Marine General
Anthony Zinni remarked, of forcing political and military
leaders to focus on the specific effects they want military
(and nonmilitary) action to achieve.13
However, the White Paper treats the effects as ends in
themselves, rather than connecting them to political and
strategic objectives. Once again, this assumption
presupposes that an opponent is nothing more than a
mappable system. Worse still, this system is assumed to be
reactive rather than proactive, and static rather than
dynamic. When asked to describe effects-based operations,
7

for example, a senior official involved in the
experimentation process said that they amounted to an
approach that “dissolves the glue” that holds a table
together, rather than striking at its individual legs.14
Unfortunately, this metaphor reflects a tendency to view
adversaries as inert objects—as tables—waiting to be hit,
rather than as thinking beings capable of acting first, or
indeed of preempting one’s attack. In other words, RDO
presupposes an enemy that does not attempt to anticipate
or preempt hostile actions or seek to change his
decisionmaking apparatus before we can map it.
The third flawed assumption underpinning RDO is that
an adversary is a system of systems. This phrase, which
derives from a combination of RMA-speak and language
concerning complex adaptive systems employed by
complexity theorists, is merely a trendy and ultimately
ineffective way to describe the total sum of an adversary’s
political, strategic, operational, and tactical
decisionmaking activities.15 The phrase first originated
among those RMA proponents who sought to tie
sensor-shooter-assessor linkages together into a single,
holistic, information-sharing system that could perform all
critical combat functions. 16 While the term complex
adaptive system may well convey the sense that opponents
can adapt to their environment in complex (and successful)
ways, it does not impart sufficient proactive agency to them.
In other words, it assumes that they are primarily
reactive—innovating within the constraints of their
environment—rather than attempting to step beyond those
boundaries. Hence, the RDO White Paper’s use of the term
tends to limit the choices that an adversary might select.
Furthermore, the assumption presupposes that an
adversary can be paralyzed by a few well-placed strikes
against its critical nodes. Although a worthy goal, history
shows that such paralysis rarely occurs. Adversaries tend to
recover rather quickly from an initial shock. Often, the
severed pieces of an opponent’s armed forces tend to fight
on, carrying out the last orders they received (e.g., the Red
8

Army in 1941-42) or taking actions independent of orders
(e.g., the U.S. Army in the Battle of the Bulge, 1944). As
previously mentioned, in an age of proliferating CBRNE
weapons, the actions of such severed elements cannot be
considered irrelevant. An adversary’s military forces,
carrying out the last orders they received, can still launch
devastating CBRNE attacks—overtly and covertly—
against the United States, or one of its strategic partners.
Thus, the advantage of attacking the enemy’s coherence
may be lost. Moreover, while RDO will presumably continue
to evolve as a concept—reflecting the results of further
experimentation, exploration, and critical analysis—the
sterility of war-gaming environments will make it difficult,
if not impossible, to discover what factors, if any, would
actually lead to an opponent’s psychological collapse.
A fourth faulty assumption underpinning RDO is that
the United States or its coalition partners can identify,
attack, and destroy whatever an adversary values most, and
in so doing break his will to fight.17 This assumption
presupposes that U.S. adversaries would conform to the
same rational-actor model that characterizes its own
behavior. However, models that describe the behaviors of
ideologues can differ markedly from our own. For example,
during the missile crisis of 1962, Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara considered it perfectly reasonable to sacrifice Cuba
in a nuclear exchange with the United States in order to
further the cause of socialism. Fortunately, the Soviets did
not agree, believing that the United States would also
launch missiles at the USSR.18 Even in the simplest
scenarios—where what an adversary values most is power
rather than ideology—domestic or coalition concerns may
not permit the United States to employ the capabilities
necessary to get at the basic source of an opponent’s power,
whatever that may be. Thus, asserting that RDO will
deprive an enemy of what he values most is too facile a
solution for some situations and completely unrealistic for
others.

9

The fifth faulty assumption underlying RDO is that all
elements of national power can be brought together in a
single operation that is both rapid and decisive.19 Yet, the
paper includes no discussion of just how RDO—and military
power in general—would actually operate in combination
with the other elements of national power, aside from the
benefit the Joint Task Force commander would derive from
additional information (if indeed this is a benefit). For
example, some of the most potent tools of economic
power—blockades and sanctions—generally require a great
deal of time to work and often entail a significant amount of
collateral damage. It is not clear, therefore, that RDO and
economic sanctions—or other tools—could work together to
produce results that are both rapid and decisive, at least not
without substantial modification. Such integration, if
possible at all, could produce a powerful synergy. The White
Paper must, however, do more than assert that such
integration should occur: it must discuss how RDO
integrates each element of national power and the
advantages and disadvantages involved in doing so.
Identifying and Analyzing Assumptions.
With good reason, U.S. defense planners explicitly
identify assumptions made in the development of war plans.
While the process for explicitly identifying planning
assumptions is neither scientific nor foolproof, it is
extremely valuable because it makes war planners and
decisionmakers more cognizant of at least some of the plan’s
inherent risks. Such an awareness would also prove
tremendously valuable for concept developers who could
then address a concept’s inherent risks. However, to date,
no process for identifying and analyzing assumptions is
included in the development of operational concepts. The
numerous faulty assumptions underpinning RDO only
underscore the need for such a process.
One possible tool for examining assumptions is the
Assumption-Based Planning tool, an instrument for
10

long-range planning, developed by the RAND Corporation,
that has gained currency in recent years. 2 0
Assumption-Based Planning involves five steps: 1)
identifying the explicit and implicit assumptions expected
to remain true over a reasonable time horizon; 2) identifying
assumption vulnerabilities; 3) defining signposts that will
indicate when an assumption has become vulnerable; 4)
defining appropriate shaping actions that avoid assumption
vulnerabilities; and 5) defining hedging actions that
minimize the impact of an assumption failure. Although it
does not claim to be a panacea, Assumption-Based Planning
does offer a much improved alternative to trends-based
forms of planning which posit only a single (usually either
most likely or worst case) future.21 Most important,
Assumption-Based Planning helps expose organizational
assumptions that might prove invalid, and therefore
dangerous, to a long-range plan in a given period of time. Its
success depends on the ability of decisionmakers to link
their implicit and explicit assumptions to events in the
physical world. With some adjustment, the methodology
presented in Assumption-Based Planning could apply to the
crafting of vision documents as well as to the development of
future operational concepts. In other words, with little
adjustment, Assumption-Based Planning could become an
Assumption-Based Concept Development tool.
Assumption-Based Concept Development would thus
help identify the critical assumptions underpinning RDO.
For example, with regards to RDO’s first assumption—that
it is an appropriate, indeed necessary, response in any
situation involving a high-end, smaller scale
contingency—Assumption-Based Concept Development
would guide concept developers first to identify the
assumption’s vulnerabilities. An example of such a
vulnerability is that history shows that U.S. political
leaders have tended to hedge their bets in crises by opting
for a graduated response so as to avoid escalation or
over-commitment. Thus, RDO might have little appeal to
them. Second, Assumption-Based Concept Development
11

would guide concept developers to define signposts for
indicating just how vulnerable this assumption is, and
validate those vulnerabilities through rigorous war games.
Third, once assumption vulnerabilities are validated,
concept developers would then seek shaping adjustments to
the concept that might make RDO more flexible, and thus
more practicable and appealing to the political leadership.
Finally, Assumption-Based Concept Development would
guide concept developers to incorporate hedging
adjustments into the concept, admitting, for example, that
it has very limited applicability except at specific points
along the spectrum of operations.
However, using Assumption-Based Concept
Development would also require a basic understanding of
the tool’s limitations. The first of these involves the
sensitivity of human perceptions. Assumption-Based
Concept Development would require the identification of
genuine and unambiguous signposts. 22 Yet, in fluid
environments, signposts are myriad, conflicting, and at
times almost invisible. For example, strategic bombing
theory was inspired by events during World War I, such as
the bombing of London by German zeppelins which caused a
temporary wave of panic among the British population. The
assumption derived from this and similar events was that
massive air bombardments could win wars by themselves.
However, as World War II showed, such bombardments
tended to strengthen rather than collapse an adversary’s
will to fight.23 In other words, no genuine and unambiguous
signpost appeared to indicate that the fundamental
assumption of strategic bombing theory was flawed.
In addition to the very real problem of signpost
detection, Assumption-Based Concept Development
implies that the identification of explicit and implicit
assumptions is easy. An organization’s ability to identify its
assumptions depends upon its willingness to perform
rigorous self-critical analyses. In other words, the
identification of explicit and implicit assumptions might not
proceed much beyond a superficial analysis.
12

Third, shaping and hedging actions will compete for
finite resources, possibly leading to a situation in which
preparing for one precludes achieving success in another.
For example, shaping actions in all armies at the turn of the
century propelled improvements in firepower technologies,
especially cannon, munitions, and powder, so that by 1914,
artillery had increased dramatically in number and calibre.
However, resources demanded by this and other shaping
actions far exceeded those invested in appropriate hedging
actions such as the development of armored fighting
vehicles. In a world of limited budgets, therefore, military
establishments must balance resources among shaping and
hedging actions, an activity that might complicate—if not
compromise—the development of operational concepts over
the long term. If the processes for achieving technological
integration are not flexible and responsive, therefore, the
accurate identification of signposts and assumptions might
not matter.
Fourth, in a dynamic global environment such as today’s
in which technological change could well occur within
institutional decision or adjustment cycles, hedging
actions—while appearing to remedy vulnerable
assumptions—might only further reduce the overall pace of
technological integration. Assumption-Based Concept
Development will not eliminate the risks that decision
makers face as they attempt to determine the right pace of
modernization for the U.S. military. Changing too quickly
could result in acquiring immature or inappropriate
capabilities or might even undermine the doctrinal
organization or cohesion essential to a military force.
Modernizing too slowly, on the other hand, runs the risk of
fielding a force with outclassed and, therefore, restricted
capabilities.
The point of airing these concerns is to emphasize that
Assumption-Based Concept Development is merely a tool. It
is only one of many ways to examine the assumptions that
underpin operational concepts. Other weaknesses in the
process—especially in an environment in which change is
13

rapid, pervasive, and nonlinear—could well compromise
the overall effort. The value of a tool like Assumption-Based
Concept Development depends upon how well it
compensates for human limitations within a particular
environment. It certainly offers no silver bullets. In any
case, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) would do well to
maintain a push-pull approach for incorporating
technological innovations into operational concepts.
Operational concepts drive technology toward desired
end-states, while technology offers new capabilities—actual
and potential—that might enlarge, cancel, or otherwise
alter operational concepts.
An Alternative Concept.
Concept developers should build enough elasticity into a
concept so that it can accommodate shaping and hedging
actions. As we have seen, as an operational concept, RDO is
too rigid and several of its critical assumptions are flawed.
Rather than revising RDO, concept developers might do
better to scrap it entirely in favor of a concept that focuses on
making movement and fire interdependent for the purpose
of accomplishing a broad range of political objectives, from
the political defeat of an adversary to the mere destruction
of his offensive capabilities. Whereas RDO focuses on
attacking an opponent’s center of gravity or threatening
“what he values most,” a concept that concentrates on
interdependence—call it interdependent maneuver or any
name that conveys mutual dependence—would permit
policymakers more flexibility in determining just what the
military instrument should accomplish in any particular
situation.24
As we have seen, RDO tends to tie the hands of the NCA
by permitting only one kind of response to any number of
smaller scale contingencies. Enough historical data exists
to enable the Joint Staff’s experimenters to identify and
analyze the political objectives that U.S. military forces will
most likely have to accomplish over the next 15-20 years.
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Our focus then, as military professionals, should be on
developing a force and attendant concepts to accomplish
those various objectives more effectively and efficiently. Too
often, however, military experimentation tends to focus on
defeating an opponent in a largely conventional scenario on
the assumption that it is the most difficult task and that, if it
can be accomplished, so too can most other tasks.
Simply put, interdependent maneuver would mean
applying the principles of fire and movement to the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war simultaneously. It
would amount to elevating a tactical concept to an
operational and strategic one. Yet, the advance, or expected
advance, of information, maneuver, and firepower
technologies over the next 15-20 years (the focus of JV 2020)
makes such an approach feasible. Interdependent
maneuver would also exploit the fact that the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war can be seen as a
single continuum of military activity.25
The levels of war have actually never been more than
arbitrary categories used to help military planners assign
objectives, resources, and responsibilities to subordinate
commands in an attempt to manage conflict. In 21st century
warfare, therefore, it might prove more useful to see warfare
as an open (rather than closed) system of military
actions—whether hand-to-hand combat or strategic
bombing—linked together in time and space by a growing
variety of information systems. It might also prove useful to
see those actions as divided into two parts: a) fire—the
ability to inflict lethality, whether by the tip of a bayonet or
a computer virus; and b) movement—the physical
relocation necessary to deliver that lethality, whether by a
soldier crawling across the battlefield or pressing a
computer key.
Interdependent maneuver would thus bring the synergy
of fire and movement to what traditionally have been known
as the operational and strategic levels of war. For example,
once the decision is made to employ military force in
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response to a crisis, interdependent maneuver means that
integrated ground, naval, and aerospace forces would begin
moving into the theater while at the same time laying down
suppressive fires throughout. Such fires would engage what
traditionally would have been considered the adversary’s
tactical forces, as well as his operational and strategic
reserves, and other critical strategic assets. The fires would
of course be a combination of aerospace, land, and naval
systems employing lethal as well as nonlethal weapons to
facilitate the insertion of ground units. These units would
initially consist primarily of special forces equipped with
reach-back support and nonline-of-sight fires. They would
deploy in and around key terrain to provide human
intelligence, report battle damage assessment, augment
other special operations forces already in theater, and
interdict enemy movements with reach-back fires.
The suppressive effects of fires executed throughout the
theater would in turn enable additional aerospace, naval,
and perhaps heavier ground forces to arrive in theater and,
situation permitting, deploy directly into combat. These
forces would exploit the known seams—either already in
existence or created by interdiction fires—in the enemy’s
defensive zones and maneuver to obtain a position of
advantage. In the meantime, suppressive fires would
continue throughout, developing the synergy that comes
from fire and movement. Interdependent maneuver thus
presents an adversary with a constant rain of destruction
throughout his entire defensive zone, as well as the threat of
inevitable capture or destruction by ground maneuver
forces via the close fight.
Interdependent maneuver has an added benefit in that
it applies just as well to scenarios that resemble people’s
wars more than they do traditional maneuver conflicts. If
such a war is in the first phase—building a political
base—interdependent maneuver would likely entail less
suppressive fires and a greater number of ground elements
so as to isolate enemy forces from the indigenous
population, destroy their supply caches, and interdict their
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efforts to reestablish a logistics flow. If the people’s war is in
the second phase—expansion—interdependent maneuver
would be employed to preempt further expansion.
Suppressive fires and ground elements would operate in
tandem to reduce known enemy concentrations, effect
isolation, and erode indigenous support. The third phase of
a people’s war—full scale counter offensive—resembles a
conventional conflict and most likely would be dealt with as
discussed above.
Interdependent maneuver is much more than linking
ground maneuver with halt-phase doctrine, which claims
that air power alone can decisively defeat a large-scale
armored attack. First, interdependent maneuver calls for a
fully Joint approach from the outset, generating synergy
with the interaction between fire and movement, rather
than placing the burden of success on one dimension with
the others absent or only in supporting roles. Second,
halt-phase doctrine applies only to a very limited segment of
the threat spectrum; it cannot effectively address a people’s
war, for example. In fact, the type of conflict to which
halt-phase doctrine applies, namely, armored engagements
in relatively open terrain as in the Middle East or the
Korean peninsula, is becoming rarer.26 By contrast,
interdependence is based upon the principle of presenting
an adversary with a dual threat—destruction by fire or by
the close fight. As lethal and accurate as it is, aerospace
power alone is simply too easy to counter. American joint
forces need a truly integrative operational concept that
gives them every possible military advantage.
In conclusion, changes wrought by the transformation of
the U.S. military will not necessarily make warfare less
difficult. The means of warfare will continue to change—at
times very rapidly, but at other times much more slowly. To
keep proper pace with such changes, U.S. forces will need an
operational concept that is both integrative and
stimulative. Unfortunately, RDO fails in its integrative
function. It is an incoherent concept that rests on several
faulty assumptions. To prevent such concepts from creating
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false expectations and leading to potentially disastrous
results, the U.S. military will need a process for identifying
and analyzing assumptions in concept development, as well
as a process for developing the necessary shaping and
hedging actions to address those assumptions. Such
processes might lead to a revolution in concept development
that JFCOM could lead. This revolution would advance the
view that warfare is an open rather than a closed system—a
phenomenon comprised of dynamic, interactive dimensions
that do not necessarily lend themselves to systems analysis.
A revolution in concept development would only
complement the Services’ current transformation efforts by
creating an adaptive intellectual framework that would
help exploit (or temper) dramatic advances in technology.
ENDNOTES
1. Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) White Paper, United States
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), J9 Joint Futures Lab, Coordinating
Draft (Version 2.0), dated August 9, 2001. RDO synthesizes a broad
range of ideas extracted from works by RAND, the Institute for Defense
Analyses, Defense Group, Inc., and others. It remains a work in progress
and will likely undergo further refinement in the near future, especially
in the course of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
experimentation efforts Millennium Challenge 2002 and Olympic
Challenge 2004.
2. It builds upon the operational concepts outlined in JV2020: Full
Spectrum Dominance, Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement,
Focused Logistics, and Full-dimensional Protection.
3. RDO, p. ii. Emphasis added.
4. The White Paper (p. 9) attempts to ascribe “absolute” and
“relative” properties to speed, but as Einstein showed in his general
theory of relativity published in 1905, speed and time are always
relative.
5. RDO, p. 9.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. i.

18

8. See Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015.
9. RDO, pp. 16-17.
10. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy J. Sakulich, USAF, “Precision
Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise or Wishful
Thinking?” Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, April 2001, uses
complexity theory to refute the notion that precision engagement can
produce desired effects with any degree of certainty.
11. RDO, pp. 5, A-2.
12. C. J. Anker, Jr., and A. V. Gafarian, The Validity of Assumptions
Underlying Current Uses of Lanchester Attrition Rates, White Sands,
NM: TRADOC, 1988.
13. Christian Lowe, “In Exercise, U.S. Military Practices
Unconventional Warfare,” Defense Week, May 21, 2001, p. 2. The
exercise referred to is Unified Vision, conducted from May 3-24, 2001.
14. Lowe, “Unconventional Warfare,” p. 2.
15. This new paradigm assumes that continuous change and
dynamic interaction, rather than equilibrium, represent the universe’s
normal state. It employs an interdisciplinary rather than a segregated
approach to science, borrowing from disciplines as disparate as biology,
economics, physics, and chemistry to help explain the dynamic nature of
physical phenomena. The fundamental principles of this new paradigm
maintain that: 1) every component within a system, no matter how
small or seemingly insignificant, plays a part in final outcome
determination; therefore, we must treat systems holistically rather
than focusing only on key players; 2) predictable and nonpredictable
phenomena coexist and interact in the physical world producing
complex networks containing too many variables or relationships to
consistently calculate outcomes; 3) a small change in the input to a
system can result in disproportionate effects; 4) systems, whether
individuals, armies, or bureaucracies, tend to evolve toward greater
complexity; and 5) these complex adaptive systems (CAS)
“spontaneously reorganize” themselves when confronted with crises; in
these moments of challenge we generally find the system at its most
innovative and creative. The following are helpful for understanding the
basics of complexity theory: James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New
Science, New York: Viking, 1987; M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The
Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1992; John H. Holland, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” Daedalus, Vol.

19

CXXI, Winter 1992, pp. 17-30; Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz,
Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security,
Vol. XVII, Winter 1992-93, pp. 82-90; and Jack Snyder and Robert
Jervis, eds., Coping with Complexity in the International System,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
16. For an example, see Admiral William A. Owens, “The Emerging
U.S. System of Systems,” in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The
Winning Edge, Martin Libicki and Stuart Johnson, eds., Washington,
DC: National Defense University, 1996, p. 3.
17. RDO, p. 9.
18. During the 1962 missile crisis, Guevara wrote of the need to
“walk by the path of liberation even when it may cost millions of atomic
victims.” Castro was less fanatical, but also refused to retreat from the
possibility of nuclear holocaust.
19. RDO, pp. 9-10, 14-20.
20. James Dewar, Carl Builder, William Hix, and Morlie Levin,
Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain
Times, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993.
21. Appendix B of Assumption-Based Planning discusses the
differences between Assumption-Based Planning and other forms of
long-term planning.
22. Assumption-Based Planning, pp. 25-26.
23. Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities and Civilians: Airpower
Strategy in World War II, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1993; and Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, New York: W. W. Norton,
1995, present conflicting views on the success of strategic bombing.
24. For a more detailed discussion of interdependent maneuver, see
Echevarria, “Interdependent Maneuver.”
25. On the idea of the merging levels of war, see Douglas A.
Macgregor, “Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War,” Parameters,
Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 33-47.
26. Halt-Phase advocates have made broad claims for the concept.
See Rebecca Grant, Airpower and the Total Force: The Gift of Time,
Arlington, VA: IRIS Independent Research, 1998. For an example of a
concept combining halt-phase and ground action in a support role, see
James Riggins and David E. Snodgrass, “Halt Phase Plus Strategic

20

Preclusion: Joint Solution for a Joint Problem,” Parameters, Vol. 29, No.
3, Autumn 1999, pp. 70-85. For critiques of halt-phase doctrine, see Earl
H. Tilford, Jr., Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in Old Skins . . . with
Powerpoint, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 1998; and Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.,
“Clashes of Visions: Sizing and Shaping Our Forces in a Fiscally
Constrained Environment” in Future Warfare: An Anthology, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
1999, pp. 81-94.

21

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert R. Ivany
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven Metz
Author
Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II
Director of Publications
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell

